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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 47Abstract
This paper compares the link between exchange rates and interest
rates under full information and two alternative asymmetric informa-
tion approaches. It also distinguishes between cases of expansionary and
contractionary depreciations. Full information results are not robust to
the presence of informational frictions. For economies exhibiting expan-
sionary or strongly contractionary depreciations, such frictions lead to
two optimal deviations from full information outcomes: i) under asym-
metric information with signal extraction, the realisation of a relatively
less frequent shock leads the central bank to behave as if a more likely
disturbance had instead taken place; and ii) under asymmetric informa-
tion without signal extraction, the monetary authority does not react on
impact to shocks. Finally, in the case of mildly contractionary deprecia-
tions, both asymmetric information models predict a lack of response of
the central bank to aggregate demand shocks, as opposed to an o⁄setting
movement in interest rates under full information.
Keywords: Transmission mechanism; Emerging market economies;
Exchange rate; Monetary policy; Imperfect information
JEL Classi￿cation: E52, E58, F31, F41
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The link between interest rates and exchange rates has attracted considerable
research attention over recent years. This is understandable given that interest
rates and exchange rates play an important role in in￿ uencing macroeconomic
developments. First, they a⁄ect key variables such as in￿ ation, output and
￿ ows of international trade. Second, given that in￿ ation and output relate to
policymaker￿ s goals, they directly (in the case of interest rates) and indirectly
(in that of exchange rates) contribute to the determination of economic policy.
Third, interest rates and exchange rates constitute crucial ￿nancial variables
re￿ ecting the state of domestic and international capital markets, respectively.
Most of the studies focusing on the link between interest rates and ex-
change rates have been conducted under the assumption that agents have full
information about the state of the economy. Under standard assumptions,
standard models show that adverse real and ￿nancial shocks lead to a weak-
ening in the exchange rate and a rise in interest rates. Balance sheet e⁄ects
could lead to a reduction in the positive impact on economic activity arising
from a weakening in the exchange rate. In this case, previous studies ￿nd
that there is less of a case for raising interest rates in the face of adverse risk
premium shocks. As a result, the exchange rate ends up depreciating by a
larger amount. In the face of an adverse real shock, the exchange rate will
also depreciate by more (and interest rates be further lowered), the smaller
the responsiveness of output to exchange rates. Finally, the literature has
investigated situations under which a weakening in domestic currencies could
lead to contractions in economic activity (that is, "contractionary devaluation"
scenarios). The covariance between exchange rates and interest rates, condi-
tional on adverse risk premium and net export shocks, can be shown to be turn
positive for strongly contractionary depreciations and - under forward-looking
foreign exchange markets - also for mildly contractionary ones.
It might surprise many readers that the literature has focused on full infor-
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information about all relevant economic data, while in addition some agents
are better informed about the evolution of the economy than others. In par-
ticular, policymakers do not a⁄ord the luxury of an error-free assessment of
current market conditions at the time of taking their decisions. Building on
this insight, the purpose of this paper is to extend the existing studies by as-
sessing the role that informational frictions play in determining comovements
between interest rates and exchange rates. I derive results under the assump-
tion of both full and imperfect information. Regarding the latter case, I study
two types of asymmetric information: a) asymmetric information with signal
extraction, in which case the central bank learns about real-time data prop-
erties embodied in the latest exchange rate developments; and b) asymmetric
information without signal extraction, shocks are not known to any agents in
the economy at the time of the monetary policy decision.
The results of this paper show that full information outcomes appear not
to be robust to the presence of informational frictions. More concretely, three
important di⁄erences arise between full information and the imperfect informa-
tion models analysed here. For economies exhibiting expansionary or strongly
contractionary depreciations, such frictions are responsible for two optimal
deviations from full information outcomes: i) under asymmetric information
with signal extraction, the realisation of a relatively less frequent shock leads
the central bank to behave as if a more likely disturbance had instead taken
place; and ii) under asymmetric information without signal extraction, the
monetary authorities does not react on impact to shocks hitting the economy.
Finally, in the case of mildly contractionary depreciations, both asymmetric
information models predict a lack of response of the central bank to aggregate
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The relation between interest rates and exchange rates has attracted con-
siderable research attention over recent years. This is understandable given
that interest rates and exchange rates play an important role in in￿ uencing
macroeconomic developments. First, they a⁄ect key variables such as in￿ a-
tion, output and ￿ ows of international trade. Second, given that in￿ ation
and output relate to policymaker￿ s goals, they directly (in the case of interest
rates) and indirectly (in that of exchange rates) contribute to the determina-
tion of economic policy. Third, interest rates and exchange rates constitute
crucial ￿nancial variables re￿ ecting the state of domestic and international
capital markets. The research interest has been equally intense in industrial
and developing countries. One factor fostering the development of such analy-
ses has been the increasing role played by price-stability oriented monetary
frameworks - including in￿ ation targeting - around the globe. In the case of
emerging market economies (EMEs), many have recently introduced changes
in their monetary and exchange rate policies, moving to in￿ ation targeting
regimes which operate o¢ cially under ￿ exible exchange rate regimes.1 Among
these countries, exchange rate variability - in itself and vis-￿-vis interest rate
variability - has in recent years risen compared to previous periods charac-
terised by far more rigid exchange rate regimes, even if the extent of such
￿ uctuations is still a matter of debate.
Most of the studies focusing on the link between interest rates and ex-
change rates have been conducted under the assumption that agents have
full information about the state of the economy. Under standard assump-
tions, standard models show that adverse real and ￿nancial shocks lead to a
weakening in the exchange rate and a rise in interest rates. Those standard
assumptions include that an exchange rate weakening has a positive impact on
economic activity. One area that has recently been investigated concerns how
1See, e.g., Amato and Gerlach (2002), Carare and Stone (2003) and Fraga et al. (2003).
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demand to the exchange rate. Detken and Gaspar (2003) and Eichengreen
(2005) assess the situation of adverse balance sheet e⁄ects as eliciting a lower
response of aggregate demand to exchange rates. In this case, they ￿nd that
there is less of a case for raising interest rates in the face of adverse risk pre-
mium shocks. As a result, the exchange rate ends up depreciating by a larger
amount. Eichengreen (2005) also ￿nds that, in the face of an adverse real
shock, the exchange rate will also depreciate by more (and in this case in-
terest rates be further lowered), the smaller the responsiveness of output to
exchange rates. Another set of results is reported by Eichengreen (2005) and
SÆnchez (2005), who explicitly analyse situations under which a weakening in
domestic currencies could lead to contractions in economic activity (that is,
"contractionary devaluation" scenarios).2 The former author shows that the
covariance between exchange rates and interest rates, conditional on adverse
risk premium and net export shocks, is negative for expansionary deprecia-
tions and positive for strongly contractionary ones. SÆnchez (2005) con￿rms
these ￿ndings, but deviates from Eichengreen (2005) in reporting that the pos-
itive comovements between exchange rates and interest rates also obtain under
mildly contractionary depreciations. The latter result arises from the introduc-
tion of forward-looking behaviour in the foreign exchange market, which also
raises the issue of whether non-fundamental factors play a role in determining
the solution to the model in the case of mildly contractionary depreciations.3
2They do so by allowing for an overall negative e⁄ect of weaker real exchange rates on
output in the aggregate demand schedule. One reason behind this non-standard e⁄ect,
namely the presence of balance sheet e⁄ects arising from liability dollarisation, has attracted
most attention in the recent literature (Chang and Velasco, 2001; CØspedes et al., 2003 and
2004; and Mor￿n and Winkelried, 2005). However, it is worth mentioning that there is a
large number of rationales for contractionary devaluations and depreciations: Caves et al.
(2002) report ten such e⁄ects in their celebrated textbook!
3It is worth mentioning that, although all studies discussed in this paragraph have in
common the use of full information frameworks, they also present some modeling speci-
￿cities. For instance, Detken and Gaspar￿ s (2003) model displays forward-looking features
concerning goods and ￿nancial markets, while Eichengreen￿ s (2005) is basically a backward-
looking model. SÆnchez￿ s (2005) model is somewhere in between, sharing with Detken and
Gaspar (2003) the forward-looking features concerning ￿nancial markets, while displaying
8
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previous paragraph is the interpretation of their results as involving optimal
monetary policy. More concretely, exchange rate smoothing by means of in-
terest rates is thus shown to originate in optimal policy under ￿ otation. The
emphasis on optimal policy distinguishes this literature, at least from a ter-
minological point of view, from other analyses commonly describing similar
comovements between interest rates and exchange rates as "fear of ￿ oating" -
as also discussed in Edwards (2002).4
The distinction between expansionary and contractionary depreciations is
necessary if one wishes to address the relation between interest rates and ex-
change rates in a general fashion, that is, for the cases of both advanced and
developing countries. Authors such as Calvo (2001), Calvo and Reinhart (2001
and 2002) and Eichengreen (2005) have insisted that there are a number of
important di⁄erences between advanced economies and EMEs. The latter are
seen as being prone to exhibiting liability dollarisation, credibility problems, a
high degree of exchange rate pass-through and non-stationarities in the in￿ a-
tionary process. The literature normally ￿nds that these speci￿cities of EMEs
are responsible for a relatively small degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility in these
economies - what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) label "fear of ￿ oating".5 In par-
ticular, liability dollarisation is believed to allow exchange rate depreciations
to give rise to contractionary balance sheet e⁄ects by raising the domestic-
like Eichengreen (2005) backward-lookingness in the goods market.
4Economic models permit us to go beyond reduced-form characterisations of interest
rates and exchange rates in terms of comovements. Pending deeper structural empirical
analyses, SÆnchez (2005) analyses some case studies among EMEs that do not provide us
with an entirely clear picture. It appears however to be the case that, in response to adverse
risk premium shocks, the exchange rate has tended to depreciate on impact, thereafter
strengthening alongside interest rate hikes. The situation is less clear-cut when it comes to
shocks characterised by an exogenous fall in net exports, which have, in the cases analysed
by the author, taken place at the same time as adverse shocks to risk premia.
5This means that, despite the recently proclaimed switch to ￿ oating exchange rates, the
evidence seems to suggest a reversion to some degree of exchange rate management, albeit
one which seems to be less tight than before the crisis. In this regard, some analysts have
found considerable discrepancies between the de jure exchange rate classi￿cations and de
facto regimes (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2004).
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devaluations may be broader than this is highlighted by the fact that the em-
pirical literature has generally found that weaker currencies tend to induce
contractions in EMEs, even after including a number of di⁄erent controls (see
Ahmed, 2003, and the references cited therein). In this context, the work
of Eichengreen (2005) and SÆnchez (2005) is an attempt to rationalise the
lack of exchange rate ￿ exibility by looking at interest rate reactions aimed at
dampening variability in foreign exchange markets.
The focus on full information models that exists in the theoretical literature
might surprise many readers as it is a fact of life that agents do not have ac-
cess to real-time information about all relevant economic data, and that some
agents are better informed about the evolution of the economy than others. In
particular, policymakers do not a⁄ord the luxury of an error-free assessment
of current market conditions at the time of taking their decisions. Building on
this insight, the present paper addresses the link between interest rates and
exchange rates for cases when there are informational imperfections. In doing
so, I start by setting up a simple full information model, which draws from
the way the recent literature has formulated small open economy frameworks
under ￿ exible exchange rates.6 As in the latter paper, I use backward-looking
in￿ ationary expectations and forward-looking ￿nancial markets. Following
SÆnchez (2005), I distinguish between cases when depreciations are expan-
sionary and contractionary, while also incorporating the role of exchange rate
pass-through into domestic prices. I extend the basic full information frame-
work by deriving results also under the assumption of imperfect information.
More concretely, I study two types of asymmetric information, depending on
whether, at the time of the monetary policy decision, shocks are known to
some agents in the economy. In the ￿rst model, which builds once more on
6The model is closest to Gerlach and Smets (2000), and especially SÆnchez (2005). The
related literature also includes Ball (1999 and 2002), Svensson (2000), Taylor (1999), Mc-
Callum and Nelson (1999 and 2000), and Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005).
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turbances hitting the economy, and the central bank is able to infer some of
the new information - that is not directly available to it - through the analysis
of exchange rate developments (asymmetric information with signal extrac-
tion). In the second model, shocks are not known to any agents at that point
in time, which does not open the possibility for the central bank to deduce
real-time properties of the new data (asymmetric information without signal
extraction). The modelling of imperfect information allows me to analyse how
robust results are to the speci￿cation of informational assumptions.
The two types of informational frictions introduced in this paper can be
rationalised as capturing two possible instances in which a relevant distur-
bance is hitting the economy in relation to the period during which interest
rates are set by the central bank. In one case, the relevant shock has just
taken place, and it is therefore interesting to analyse the implications of the
possibility that the authorities deduce some real-time data properties by in-
specting current movements in exchange rates against the background of past
shock correlations. This is the variant that I label asymmetric information
with signal extraction. In the second model, the one of asymmetric informa-
tion without signal extraction, the central bank is assumed not to have access
to contemporaneous information. Moreover, at the time interest rate deci-
sions are taken the current disturbances have not yet occurred. It is thus not
possible in this case to allow monetary policy decisions to indirectly embody
inputs from other, better informed economic agents. This second approach
can be rationalised as incorporating the notion that the relevant shocks take
place right after interest rates have been set.
Informational considerations have played a prominent role in the identi￿-
cation of structural disturbances in recent empirical work. More speci￿cally,
by incorporating an "information sector" into the analysis, identi￿ed vector
autoregressions have assumed that the central bank observes some key macro-
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(such as output and prices) are only observed with a lag and are thus taken
to play no informational role.7 The present paper could be seen as indirectly
contributing to enrich the menu of identi￿cation options in two ways. First,
whenever relevant, signal extraction would imply that impulse responses could
be rather di⁄erent from what is expected from the extreme assumption that
variables are either strictly observed or strictly unobserved. In particular, the
central bank￿ s guesses regarding private sector activity (even if the latter is
objectively unobserved on a contemporaneous basis) would entail results that
depend on which shocks are expected to be more likely to occur. Second (and
alternatively), as I analyse in the asymmetric information model without sig-
nal extraction, if the most relevant shocks for monetary policy purposes occur
right after the interest rate is set, any meaningful pattern for comovements
between the latter variable and the exchange rate would imply a lagged rather
than the usually assumed contemporaneous relationship. In sum, which set of
"reasonable" results is to be used as a benchmark in empirical analysis would
depend on the speci￿c nature of informational frictions that are most relevant
to the economy in question.
The results of this paper show that full information outcomes do not ap-
pear to be robust to the presence of informational frictions. More concretely,
three important di⁄erences arise between full information and the imperfect
information models analysed here. For economies exhibiting expansionary or
strongly contractionary depreciations, such frictions are responsible for two
optimal deviations from full information outcomes: i) under asymmetric in-
formation with signal extraction, the realisation of a relatively less frequent
shock (in the present case, a net export shock) leads the central bank to be-
have as if a more likely disturbance (a risk premium disturbance) had instead
7This empirical literature has been conducted mostly for advanced economies, including
recent contributions by Kim (2003) and Sims and Zha (2006). A number of papers have
started to use this approach in the context of EMEs (see, e.g., Ma￿ ckowiak, 2003, and
Aguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2005).
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the monetary authorities does not react on impact to shocks hitting the econ-
omy. The latter di⁄erence also implies that, for expansionary depreciations, a
lower responsiveness of output to exchange rates, which has an impact on co-
movements between interest rates and exchange rates under full information,
instead fails for any shock to a⁄ect interest rates on impact under asymmetric
information without signal extraction. Finally, in the case of mildly contrac-
tionary depreciations, both asymmetric information models predict a lack of
response of the central bank to aggregate demand shocks, as opposed to an
stabilising movement in interest rates under full information.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents
a simple small open economy model which assumes full information, brie￿ y
summarising the state of the art in the literature concerning the relation-
ship between interest rates and exchange rates. In doing so, I illustrate the
workings of the model by attaching numerical values to the parameters, fol-
lowing calibrations used in previous work for small open economies. Section 3
describes the results for the two afore-mentioned types of informational imper-
fections and discusses the similarities and di⁄erences with respect to the full
information approach of section 2. Finally, section 4 presents some concluding
remarks.
2 A simple model
In order to investigate the link between interest rates and exchange rates, let
us consider a simple small open economy model.8 I allow for depreciations
to be either expansionary or contractionary. The economy specialises in the
production of a single good. Four equations describe the behaviour of the
8For a more detailed description of the full information setup, see SÆnchez (2005).
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￿ ￿(et ￿ Et￿1et) (1)
yt = ￿￿rt ￿ ￿et + "D
t (2)
rt = ￿Etet+1 + et + "
f
t (3)
rt = Rt ￿ Et￿t+1 (4)
where all variables, except the interest rate, are in logarithms and expressed
as deviations from steady state values. All parameters are assumed to be
positive, with the exception of ￿, which can adopt any real value. The value of
￿ is negative in a contractionary depreciation and positive in an expansionary
depreciation. All shocks are of the zero-mean, constant variance, type, and
are uncorrelated with each other.
Aggregate supply schedule (1) links in￿ ation (￿t) to the output gap (yt)
term and an exchange-rate pass through term. An increase in the real exchange
rate (et) denotes an appreciation. Expression (2) states that aggregate demand
is decreasing in the real interest rate (rt). Output is also allowed to depend
positively or negatively on the real exchange rate. Equation (3) is an uncovered
interest parity condition, while (4) is the Fisher equation.
The central bank minimises an intertemporal loss function that penalises
deviations of output from its potential level, yt￿"S
t , and deviations of in￿ ation







where Lt = ￿2(yt ￿ "S
t )2 + ￿(￿t ￿
~
￿t)2 (5)
To solve the model, I assume that there is full information, in the sense
that the central bank, producers and foreign exchange market participants all
observe current output, prices and nominal exchange rates. Moreover, there is
14
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I obtain Et￿1￿t = Et￿1
~
￿t; that is, expected in￿ ation equals expected targeted
in￿ ation. Using this, and assuming that the in￿ ation target adopts a ￿xed
and credible value of
~
￿; the optimal in￿ ation rate, ￿
opt





￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ’)￿(et ￿ Et￿1et) (6)
where ’ ￿ ￿=(1 + ￿). The central bank thus chooses an in￿ ation rate equal
to the term capturing the e⁄ect of unexpected exchange rate ￿ uctuations on
prices, plus a weighted average of the private sector￿ s expectations of the
in￿ ation target and the actual in￿ ation target.
Next, I assume that the risk premium shock, "
f
t , and the excess demand
shock, "xd
t ; both follow ￿rst-order autoregressive processes with uncorrelated








t in the latter.9 In consequence, I obtain:
et = (1 ￿ !)Etet+1 ￿
￿’￿
￿
(et ￿ Et￿1et) + ￿"xd
t ￿ (1 ￿ !)"
f
t (7)
Examination of (7) leads to the conclusion that the model has a forward
solution for the case when j 1 ￿ ! j< 1, and a backward solution for the
case when j 1￿! j> 1: In the rest of the section, I solve for each case in turn.
2.1 Forward solution for case when j 1 ￿ ! j< 1
The condition j 1 ￿ ! j< 1 amounts to two di⁄erent ranges for the values
of ￿, namely, ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2￿) [ (0;1): The forward solution to expectational
di⁄erence equation (7) in the absence of bubbles can be expressed in terms of
9Composite shock "
xd
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t are shocks to aggregate demand
and net exports, respectively. Coe¢ cient ￿ equals zero in my analysis of a risk premium shock
and ￿x in the study of the net export shock. Similarly, "
xd






Working Paper Series No 608
April 2006the real exchange rate and the real interest rate as:
et =
1
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
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t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿t
i
(9)
where ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿ + ￿’￿): From (9), the central bank raises interest rates in
response to a positive excess demand shock and an unfavourable risk premium
shock.
I now turn to illustrating the properties of the model by means of simula-
tions. I attach numerical values to the parameters, following calibrations used
in previous work for small open economies. For key parameter ￿, the baseline
value is chosen to equal 0.2, as in Ball (1999). I consider three other values for
￿: a) ￿ = 0:1 to assess the impact of balance sheet e⁄ects in an economy still
displaying overall expansionary depreciations; b) ￿ = ￿1:5, a large negative
value for simulations in the present subsection satisfying ￿ < ￿2￿ (strongly
contractionary depreciations); and c) ￿ = ￿0:1, a small negative value for
the study of mildly contractionary depreciations in the next subsection.10 All
other parameters are kept unchanged throughout the analysis. The values of
￿, ￿ and ￿ are taken from Ball (1999) to equal 0.4, 0.6 and 0.2, respectively. In
addition, I draw from McCallum and Nelson (1999 and 2000) for parameters of
shock persistence. The two I use in the present paper are ￿f = 0:5 and ￿x = 0:
I also reset McCallum and Nelson￿ s value for $ to 0.8 from 0.89, to capture
the fact that many small open economies are very open to international trade.
Finally, in light of the absence of a similar estimate for small open economies,
I use Barro and Broadbent￿ s (1997) estimate for ￿, obtained using US data.
Their value of ￿ = 2:58 is recalibrated to 0.41 in the present paper, taking
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account of the presence of ￿2 in (5).I study impulse responses of interest rates and exchanges rates to two
shocks in turn, one real (a favourable net export shock raising ￿xd
t ) and the
other a pure portfolio disturbance shock (an adverse risk premium shock push-
ing ￿t up). In the present subsection I run simulations for three of the four
cases mentioned before, namely, those of a positive ￿ (equalling either baseline
0.2 or 0.1) and a rather negative ￿ (￿ = ￿1:5 satisfying ￿ < ￿2￿):11 Panel A of
Figure 1 shows, for the two alternative positive values of ￿, the cumulated im-
pulse responses to both a one percent adverse risk premium shock (top chart)
and a one percent favourable net export shock (bottom chart). Panel B of
Figure 1 reports the corresponding cumulated impulse responses for ￿ = ￿1:5:
For an economy exhibiting conventional expansionary depreciations, Fig-
ure 1 (panel A, top chart) indicates that an adverse risk premium shock drives
the interest rate up and the real exchange rate down. A risk premium distur-
bance causes a real exchange rate depreciation with consequent in￿ ationary
e⁄ects via pass-through as well as incipient favourable output e⁄ects. In view
of the unambiguous in￿ ationary pressures stemming from this shock (via both
exchange rate pass-through and output), the monetary authority raises inter-
est rates.
Figure 1 (panel A, bottom chart) shows that a favourable net export shock
drives both the interest rate and real exchange rate up. The mix of monetary
policy tightening and exchange rate appreciation in turn helps ease excess
demand and in￿ ationary pressures.
In panel A of Figure 1 I consider two possible values for ￿, namely, ￿ = 0:2
(baseline) and a value re￿ ecting a smaller responsiveness of output to exchange
rates (￿ = 0:1). The comparison indicates that, for such smaller value of ￿,
there is less of a case for raising interest rates in the face of adverse ￿nancial
shocks as given here by an increase in "
f
t . In particular, a stronger monetary
11I leave the study of the remaining possible values of ￿ for the next subsection.
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output and in￿ ation when aggregate demand is less responsive to exchange
rate developments. A di⁄erent result holds when the economy is hit by a
shock directly a⁄ecting the goods market, as given here by an increase in ￿xd
t .
In this case, the lower ￿, the more there is a case for raising interest rates,
and the exchange rate thus ends up appreciating by more in real terms. It
is worth stressing that, regardless of which of the two shocks is hitting the
economy, an adverse disturbance leads to a stronger depreciation, the smaller
the responsiveness of aggregate demand to exchange rates.
Next, I study an economy exhibiting large contractionary depreciations
(￿ < ￿2￿). Panel B of Figure 1 (top chart) indicates that an adverse risk
premium shock induces both a rise in interest rates and a real exchange rate
depreciation. Unlike the case of a positive ￿; the shock now induces an incipient
contraction in aggregate demand via, say, balance sheet e⁄ects. Interest rates
are hiked in the present case to a point where exchange rates end up stronger,
thereby helping mitigate in￿ ationary pressures and supporting the real side of
the economy.
In panel B of Figure 1 (bottom chart) a favourable net export shock drives
both interest rates and the real exchange rate down. The exchange rate depre-
ciation reduces demand, thus partly o⁄setting the excess demand conditions
in the goods market.
In sum, the present model allows us to reproduce all full information results
emphasised in the literature. The covariance between exchange rates and in-
terest rates, conditional on adverse risk premium, is negative for expansionary
depreciations and positive for contractionary ones. Moreover, interest rates
are predicted to eventually rise in response to an adverse net export shock in
economies displaying strongly contractionary depreciations, and to be lowered
in the case of expansionary depreciations. Under the latter, a smaller degree of
responsiveness of aggregate demand to the exchange rate implies that adverse
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a smaller - but still positive - ￿ makes the central bank hike interest rates
further under a negative risk premium disturbance, and loosen by more in the
case of an adverse net export shock.
2.2 Backward solution for case when j 1 ￿ ! j> 1
The condition j 1 ￿ ! j> 1 refers to mildly contractionary depreciations, that
is, a range of ￿ 2 (￿2￿;0): In this case, the system is fundamentally backward














































where ￿t is a sunspot de￿ned by et = Et￿1et+ ￿t: This variable is an error that
is purely extrinsic to the economy. In the following, I neglect for simplicity
sunspot ￿t.
Use of (3) and (10), following the reasoning leading to expression (9) in
the previous subsection, allows me to characterise the central bank￿ s reaction
function in terms of the real interest rate.
Panel C of Figure 1 shows impulse responses of interest rates and exchanges
rates to the same two shocks studied in the previous subsection, that is, an
adverse risk premium shock and a favourable net export shock. Figure 1 (panel
C, top chart) reports that an adverse risk premium shock leaves both the
interest rate and real exchange rate unchanged on impact. As with the case of
strongly contractionary depreciations, shock "
f
t induces a rise in interest rates,
eventually turning the real exchange rate stronger. This limits in￿ ationary
pressures and o⁄sets contractionary forces in place.
In Figure 1 (panel C, bottom chart), a favourable net export shock raises
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impact. Starting from the second period, the results are qualitatively the same
as those taking place on impact in the case ￿ < ￿2￿, but this time extended
over a longer time horizon.
Summarising, the correlation between exchange rates and interest rates,
conditional on an adverse risk premium shock, is positive for mildly contrac-
tionary depreciations, with both of these variables going up in response to the
shock. This result coincides with that found for strongly contractionary de-
preciations, except that such positive correlation is now delayed to the second
period onwards, with both the interest rate and real exchange rate being left
unchanged on impact. Turning to the case of a favourable net export shock,
the dominant feature still is that of a positive correlation between exchange
rates and interest rates, with both going down as a consequence of the shock.
One important di⁄erence emerges, however, with respect to the case of stongly
contractionary depreciations. In the present case, the falls in real exchange
rates and interest rates are delayed to the second period onwards, instead of
taking place on impact. As analysed in this subsection, in the initial period
interest rates are raised and the exchange rate remains at baseline.
3 Imperfect information
In the model of section 2 it was assumed that the central bank could identify
the shocks that a⁄ected the economy and the exchange rate. In practice,
central banks often do not have real-time access to economic information and
cannot know the sources of disturbances. In order to analyse the consequences
of this real-world feature, in this section I introduce informational frictions in
two ways. First, I permit only some agents to know the disturbances hitting
the economy at the time monetary policy decisions are taken, and second,
shocks are assumed not to be known to any agent in the model at that time. In
the former case, I assume that it is foreign market participants, whose actions
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extract some real-time features of economic data even if new information is
not directly available to it. Conceptually, the two types of frictions introduced
belong to the category of asymmetric information. Given that in the second
model no agent knows the shocks at the time interest rates are set, the type of
imperfect information involved there shares some properties with frictions of
the common imperfect information variety. In what follows, I group both of
these models under the umbrella of asymmetric information; the ￿rst model is
further labelled "with signal extraction", and the second one "without signal
extraction".
Given the large number of cases considered in this paper (four values for
￿, two shocks and three di⁄erent informational assumptions), subsection 3.1
starts by previewing the comparison of results across models for one concrete
example. This is the case of an economy exhibiting expansionary depreciations
and being hit by a favourable net export shock. Subsections 3.2 and 3.3
then describe the two imperfect information models in turn. Subsection 3.4
compares the full set of results obtained from these two approaches with those
of full information.
3.1 An illustrative example
Let us ￿rst discuss the implications of asymmetric information for an economy
in which depreciations are expansionary and that faces a favourable net export
disturbance. As we have seen, under full information such shock induces an
interest rate hike and real exchange rate appreciation. This outcome in turn
contributes to o⁄setting excess demand and in￿ ation created by the shock.
Under asymmetric information with signal extraction, the response of the
policymaker will depend on the relative variance of disturbances. I will later
assume, in line with the literature, that risk premium shocks exhibit the largest
variability of the two shocks considered. Under that assumption, the reactions
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by the central bank to result from an exogenous reduction in risk premia
instead. Therefore, a positive disturbance to net exports leads to a fall in
both interest rates and the real exchange rate. This result is exactly the
opposite of that obtained under full information.
The comparison between full information and asymmetric information
without signal extraction in the present case follows a di⁄erent pattern. Under
the latter type of informational frictions, the central bank lacks contempora-
neous information about output and prices, and thus leaves interest rates
unchanged at the time the real shock hits - as opposed to hiking them under
full information. Regarding the real exchange rate, the appreciation following
the disturbance mirrors that found under full information.
The example examined here reveals that informational assumptions do
matter for the comovements between interest rates and exchange rates. More-
over, asymmetric information appears to have di⁄erent implications depending
on whether the monetary authority is able to extract some news from the pri-
vate sector or not. I will come back to similar comparisons in subsection 3.4,
where I contrast the full set of results.
3.2 Asymmetric information with signal extraction
In section 3 I assumed that the central bank could identify the shocks that
a⁄ected the economy and the exchange rate. It could be argued, however,
that the private sector (or at least a part of it) is better informed about de-
velopments in the sphere of production. To cope with this possibility, in this
subsection I explore the implications of informational barriers by assuming
that the central bank does not observe current output and prices. Follow-
ing Gerlach and Smets (2000), I also assume that participants in the foreign
exchange market do have information about the current supply and demand
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demand shocks that is not otherwise available to the central bank. Expecta-
tions formed using this information set are denoted E+
t : In line with these
assumptions about information, I rewrite equations (1), (2) and (3) as




￿ ￿0(st ￿ E+
t￿1st) (11)
yt = ￿￿rt ￿ ￿(st + pt) + "D
t (12)
Rt = ￿E+
t st+1 + st + "
f
t (13)
where st is the nominal exchange rate and ￿0 ￿ ￿=(1 + ￿) and ￿0 ￿ ￿=(1 +
￿). A comparison with the full information approach of section 2 reveals
that nominal exchange rates explicitly show in this subsection￿ s set-up. The
reason is that the presence of informational frictions turns necessary to further
distinguish between real and nominal variables, the latter being subjected to
processes of expectation formation that play an important role in the model.
I solve the model consisting of (4), (5), (11), (12) and (13). The central
bank￿ s contemporaneous in￿ ation perception error is









The central bank￿ s optimisation, imposing rational expectations and as-
suming a ￿xed and credible in￿ ation target, implies Et￿1￿t =
~
￿: This, together
with (4), yields rt = Rt ￿
~
￿:
Note that if the central bank observed current output or prices, it could
deduce the current excess demand shock from equations (11) and (12), in which
case in￿ ation perception errors would be zero. Under the assumption that
only foreign exchange market participants know current output and prices,
the central bank cannot form E+
t st+1: I make the same assumptions regarding
12Information about the shocks is widespread among the private sector (except for work-
ers), but the central bank infers some of the properties of the new data only by observing
current realisations of the exchange rate.
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Moreover, I postulate that the signal extraction function is of the form
Et￿xd
t = ￿[st ￿ s￿
t] (15)
where ￿ is the response parameter that needs to be determined. To see
the rationale for this signal extraction function, note that the expression in










t￿1 +￿=[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]"xd
t￿1: The latter
expression is the (unconditionally) expected value of the nominal exchange
rate when we exclude the interest rate Rt from the information set.13 In (15),
the central bank extracts information about excess demand shocks by using
its knowledge of past disturbances and the current exchange rate.
Again, the model has a forward solution for the case when j 1￿! j< 1, and
a backward solution for the case when j 1 ￿ ! j> 1: In the forward solution,
the condition j 1 ￿ ! j< 1 amounts to two di⁄erent ranges for the values of
￿, namely, ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2￿) [ (0;1): The forward solution in the absence of
bubbles can be characterised by
Rt =
~
￿ + st + pt +
￿ + ￿










￿ ￿ pt￿1 ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿f) + ￿
￿f"
f
t + s1￿t +
1





where s1 ￿ ￿z=f[￿(1￿￿f)+￿][(￿ +￿)2& ￿z]g; z ￿ (1￿’)￿0[(￿ +￿)2& ￿￿(1+
￿)] ￿ ￿0’[(￿ + ￿)& ￿ ￿]=￿0 + ￿(￿ + ￿); & ￿ (1 + ￿0￿)=[1 + ￿0(￿ + ￿)], and
s2 ￿
￿#(1 ￿ ’)￿0[(￿ + ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)& + ￿(1 + ￿)] ￿ #w ￿ (1 ￿ #￿)(￿ + ￿)
(￿ + ￿)2& ￿ (1 ￿ ’)￿0[(￿ + ￿)2& ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)] + w ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿)
13This amounts to conveniently subtracting from the exchange rate realisation the in￿ uence
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Moreover, equilibrium in￿ ation and output levels are
￿t =
~
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ’)￿0(st ￿ E+













t ;st ￿ s￿
t
￿
V ar(st ￿ s￿
t)
(20)
Using (15), (20) and the de￿nition of s￿



















That is, ￿ depends on the ratio of the variance of excess demand shocks rel-
ative to the variance of risk premium shocks (V ar(￿xd)=V ar(￿)). This ratio
can be interpreted as an indicator of the information content of changes in
the exchange rate. In particular, ￿ can be found to move towards zero as
V ar(￿xd)=V ar(￿) goes to zero. In this case, exogenous exchange rate shocks
are dominant. The signal-to-noise ratio tends to zero and the information role
of the exchange rate is lost. For this reason, the central bank relies solely
on its observation of "xd
t￿1 to assess current excess demand. In the other ex-
treme case, ￿ approaches 1=fs2 + 1=[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]g as the signal to noise
ratio V ar(￿xd)=V ar(￿) goes to in￿nity. In this case, exogenous exchange rate
shocks are non-existent, and the central bank thus concludes that exchange
rate changes are due to excess demand shocks. Since such exchange rate
changes equilibrate the goods market, the central bank wants to accommo-
date them. The central bank disregards past excess demand shocks and relies
entirely on the current exchange rate to assess current excess demand. This
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implies that it does not lean against current exchange rate changes.The backward solution once more obtains under contractionary depreci-
ations of a milder type, that is, for the range ￿ 2 (￿2￿;0): The system is
fundamentally backward-looking, and the following expression can be derived















































Given that the exchange rate is predetermined in the backward solution,
Et￿xd
t = 0: Moreover, the equilibrium in￿ ation and output levels equal ￿t =
~
￿
+￿t and yt = "S
t + ￿t=￿0, respectively.
A comparison between (22) and the corresponding expression under full
information, that is (10), reveals both points in common and di⁄erences. The
two expressions di⁄er in that, while both are backward-looking in nature, the
former is written in terms of the nominal exchange rate, while the latter is
written in terms of the real one. For this reason, an excess demand shock
a⁄ecting ￿t via ￿t will have a contemporaneous e⁄ect on the real exchange
rate under asymmetric information with signal extraction. This is not the case
under full information. In the latter case, any shock fails to contemporaneously
a⁄ect the real exchange rate, which is a backward-looking variable. In the face
of a risk premium shock, the real exchange rate does not react on impact in
either the full information case or that analysed in this subsection. Equations
(10) and (22) also have in common the implication that the real exchange rate
eventually returns to steady state. The latter results is easy to see in (10)
because this expression is directly written in terms of the real exchange rate
et. But it also holds in (22). To see this, ￿rst note that the e⁄ect of a given
shock will tend to fade away over time. Second, note that et ￿ st +pt; so that
prices a⁄ect the real exchange rate by a factor of 1+(￿=￿)
P￿
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which tends in the limit to 0.3.3 Asymmetric information without signal extraction
The previous subsection has relaxed the assumption of full information by
introducing one type of asymmetric informational friction. In this subsection
I examine the other possible case where i) information still becomes available to
foreign exchange market participants before it is known to the central bank;
but ii) it is not available to any agent in the economy at the time of the
monetary policy decision. Item ii) means that, initially, neither the central
bank nor the private sector observes current output and prices, and the former
cannot thus infer macroeconomic disturbances. To incorporate this possibility
into the model, I assume that shocks a⁄ecting endogenous variables in period t
take place after the central bank forms expectations and takes its decision. The
current exchange rate is, like output and prices, unknown to the central bank
when setting interest rates.14 As before, I label expectations formed using the
implied limited information set simply by Et and those of informed agents by
E+
t . After the central bank action is taken, the private sector observes shocks.
Producers take decisions on prices and output, and the exchange rate is set to
clear the foreign exchange market. All these private sector actions occur too
late for the central bank to factor them in during its current period￿ s decision,
but they are known to the policymaker at the time of the next monetary policy
move.
As with the asymmetric information set-up of subsection 3.1, nominal ex-
change rates are to be explicitly handled in order to solve the model. The
model still consists of equations (4), (5), (11), (12) and (13). However, the so-
lution needs to incorporate the speci￿c timing of information described in the
14This might seem odd given that information on exchange rates is easily available. The ra-
tionale for this setup is that I try to incorporate, in the context of a discrete-time framework,
the notion that there is an institutional constraint in the timing of interest rate decisions
(such as a ￿xed time interval between such decisions) as opposed to the higher frequency of
shocks and changes in prices, output and exchange rates in real-world situations.
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replaced by Etst when it comes to modelling the central bank￿ s expectations
and actions. Since the central bank does not observe current prices, I assume
that it optimises the objective function by choosing the perceived in￿ ation
rate. The contemporaneous in￿ ation perception error is





t ￿ (￿0￿ + ￿0)(st ￿ Etst)
i
(23)
Once more, we have Et￿1￿t =
~
￿; and, using (4), rt = Rt ￿
~
￿:
The equilibrium in￿ ation and output levels equal
￿t =
~








where I have used the result that Etst = E+
t￿1st.
I make the same assumptions regarding the stochastic processes driving
the shocks to the economy as in section 3 and subsection 4.1. Using (4), (11),















Once more, the model has a forward solution for the case when j 1￿! j< 1,
and a backward solution for the case when j 1￿! j> 1: In the forward solution,
the condition j 1 ￿ ! j< 1 amounts to two di⁄erent ranges for the values of
￿, namely, ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2￿) [ (0;1): The forward solution in the absence of
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￿ ￿ pt￿1 ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿f) + ￿
"
f
t + s3￿t +
￿





where s3 ￿ ￿x=[￿(1￿￿f)+￿]; s4 ￿ [1￿(1￿￿)￿0(￿+￿)]=f(1￿￿0)[￿(1￿￿)+￿]g;
and x ￿ f￿[1 + ￿0(￿ + ￿)] + ￿0￿g=(1 ￿ ￿0):
The backward solution obtains when j 1 ￿ ! j> 1: This condition refers to
contractionary depreciations of a milder type, that is, the range ￿ 2 (￿2￿;0):
In the absence of sunspots, the nominal exchange rate is found to still be given
by (22). The interpretation is, however, somewhat di⁄erent. In subsection 4.1
the central bank observes the current exchange rate, but given that the latter
is purely backward-looking under mildly contractionary depreciations, it does
not reveal any fresh information on the shocks hitting the economy. In the
present subsection, the monetary authorities do not observe the exchange rate,
with the same outcome that they ignore the current state of the economy.
Finally, equilibrium in￿ ation is again given by (24), while equilibrium output
simpli￿es further from (25) to yt = "S
t + ￿t=￿0.
3.4 Comparison with the full information case
This subsection makes a comparison of results obtained under imperfect in-
formation with the full information case. In making this comparison, I relate
Figure 1 (the full information case) to Figures 2 (asymmetric information with
signal extraction) on the one hand, and 3 (asymmetric information without
signal extraction) on the other. In addition to the parameter values used
for calibration in section 3, simulation analysis under asymmetric information
with signal extraction also requires some values for the variances of the shocks.
These extra parameter values, taken from McCallum and Nelson (2000), are:
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V ar(￿) = 0:042; V ar("S) = 0:0072; V ar("d) = 0:012 and V ar("x) = 0.Let us start by comparing the full information case with that of asymmet-
ric information with signal extraction. Under the latter assumption, panel A
of Figure 2 shows, for the two alternative positive values of ￿, the cumulated
impulse responses to risk premium and net export shocks, which can be com-
pared with the corresponding panel of Figure 1 under full information. Panels
B and C of Figure 2 report cumulated impulse responses for ￿ = ￿1:5 and
￿ = ￿0:1, thereby being comparable to the respective panels of Figure 1.
In the case of an economy exhibiting standard expansionary depreciations,
panel A of Figure 2 indicates that the simulation results under asymmetric in-
formation with signal extraction are little or considerably changed from those
found for the full information case (see Figure 1, panel A) depending on which
of the two shocks are realised. In Figure 2 (panel A, top chart), an adverse risk
premium shock drives the interest rate up and the real exchange rate down.
Moreover, under a lower response of output to exchange rates (a lower ￿), the
policymaker raises interest rates by a smaller amount in the face of an adverse
￿nancial shock of the same magnitude. That is, I now obtain qualitatively
the same results as under full information, with informational frictions only
accounting for small quantitative di⁄erences. Such minor changes in response
to a rise in "f are understandable. In the previous paragraph, I have as-
sumed a large variability of the risk premium shock relative to that of excess
demand for my baseline simulations. Therefore, the central bank will infer
that the shock driving foreign exchange market developments is likely to be
a risk premium shock, which is as we know the case. With regard to the
corresponding comparison for net export shocks, the bottom chart of Figure
2 (panel A) stands in sharp contrast with the corresponding chart in Figure
1. In the latter chart, which obtains under full information, the disturbance
induces rises in both interest rates and the real value of domestic currency. In
Figure 2 (panel A), which is produced under the assumption of asymmetric
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to the opposite result: both interest rates and the real exchange rate fall as a
result of the shock. As discussed in subsection 3.1, the reason for this di⁄er-
ence resides exactly on the same factor that is responsible for the similarity
of results under risk premium shocks. In the present case, based on exchange
rate developments and past shock correlations, the central bank is led to think
that the disturbance is more likely to be a favourable risk premium shock than
a positive net export shock. Since the former disturbance would reduce in￿ a-
tion and be contractionary, the central bank cuts interest rates to the point -
given the baseline set of parameter values - of even weakening the exchange
rate. One corollary of this comparison of results is that there is a trade-o⁄
involved in how asymmetric information with signal extraction relates to full
information. The closer results are for one type of shock (under the present
parameter values, the risk premium shock), the sharper the contrast with the
other type (in the current environment, the net export shock, that is, an excess
demand disturbance). It is worth mentioning that, with a di⁄erent ranking
of the variability in the two shocks in question, the speci￿c results would be
reversed, but the trade-o⁄ in the comparability of results across models would
still obtain.15
I now examine the role of the responsiveness of output to the exchange
rate. Panels A in Figures 1 and 2 have in common that: a) the exchange rate
exhibits a larger variation under when ￿ equals 0.1 than when ￿ = 0:2 (in
particular depreciating by more in the ￿rst case under adverse realisations of
either ￿nancial or real disturbances); and b) the interest rate rises by less under
adverse risk premium shocks and is lowered by more in the face of favourable
net export disturbances.16 It is worth looking at this conclusion regarding the
15That is, the results under the assumption of asymmetric information with signal extrac-
tion would resemble those obtained under full information in the face of net export shocks,
and this at the expense of the similarity found for risk premium disturbances in the baseline
scenario.
16One interesting di⁄erence between the bottom charts in panels A of Figures 1 and 2
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The latter showed that the results for risk premium shocks are qualitatively
the same as those found under full information, while for net export shocks
the responses themselves are of opposite signs.
Turning to the case of strongly contractionary depreciations, how much
results are a⁄ected by informational frictions once more depends on which
of the two disturbances hit the economy (panel B in Figure 2 versus that in
Figure 1). Under full information, panel B of Figure 2 (top chart) indicates
that an adverse risk premium shock induces a rise in both interest rates and the
real exchange rate. Instead, the results found under asymmetric information
with signal extraction di⁄er markedly from the full information ones in the
face of net export disturbances. Figure 2 (panel B, bottom chart) shows that
a favourable net export shock drives both interest rates and the real exchange
rate up, as opposed to down in the corresponding chart in Figure 1. The reason
for this di⁄erence lies, as discussed for Figure 2 (panel A, bottom chart), in
the signal extraction problem facing the central bank. Using their knowledge
about current exchange rate movements and past history, the central bank
judges that the shock is more likely to be a favourable risk premium shock
than a positive net export shock.
For mildly contractionary depreciations, a comparison of panel C of Figure
2 with that of Figure 1 permits us to assess whether results under asymmetric
information with signal extraction di⁄er from those obtained under full infor-
mation. It is worth pointing out that this comparison carries out to both types
of asymmetric information, and not simply to that with signal extraction. To
start with, the reason why results for the two imperfect information models
coincide here is better understood in two steps. First, in neither case does
the central bank observe the shocks presently hitting the economy. Second, in
is that the interest rate and the exchange rate (in deviations from steady state) are now
identical. This can be corroborated in equation (16) by setting the risk premium shock to
zero and, in line with my calibrations, ￿x and thus ￿ to zero as well.
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ous shocks: In the model without signal extraction, the central bank cannot
deduce anything about the current state of the economy prior to the mone-
tary policy decision simply because the private sector is still unaware of the
shocks, while in the case with signal extraction, even if the monetary author-
ities observe the current exchange rate, the latter variable is not informative
about the contemporaneous economic conditions because it is determined in
a backward-looking fashion. The comparison between panels C of Figures 1
through 3 indicates that informational asymmetries do not have any impact
on the results in the face of a risk premium shock, while they make a di⁄erence
in the case of net export disturbances. The reasons for this are the following.
Under either imperfect information model, the nominal exchange rate is back-
ward looking, and given that the central bank does not react on impact, the
￿rst-period behaviour of the real exchange rate depends on whether the distur-
bance a⁄ects the price level. It turns out that the latter is unchanged following
a risk premium disturbance, but it increases in response to a favourable net
export shock. This implies that in the initial period the former shock leaves
the real exchange rate una⁄ected, while the latter shock induces a real ex-
change rate appreciation. The top charts in panels C of Figures 1 through 2
are identical: Regardless of whether informational frictions are in place, a risk
premium disturbance leaves the interest rate and the real exchange rate both
una⁄ected on impact. The ensuing dynamics is also the same, again regardless
of whether information is full or imperfect. Instead, the bottom chart in panel
C of Figure 1 is di⁄erent from the corresponding charts in Figures 2 and 3,
revealing that informational asymmetries leave their mark on the results. As
mentioned before, a favourable net export shock leads to a real exchange rate
appreciation on impact under imperfect information, while the interest rate
stays at its baseline level. This is not the case under full information, in which
situation the real exchange rate - which is directly observed by the authorities -
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understandably reacts to the expansionary and in￿ ationary shock in question
by tightening monetary policy. Following the initial period, the dynamics fol-
lowing this net export shock are also di⁄erent between the full and imperfect
information models. Under full information, both the interest rate and the
real exchange rate fall below baseline before eventually going back to steady
state. Instead, asymmetric information models predict that the interest rate
will be higher and the real exchange rate will remain stronger before starting
their convergent paths to long run levels.17
We have seen that panels C of Figures 2 and 3 report results for mildly
contractionary depreciations under both types of asymmetric information ap-
proaches. What is left now is the analysis of asymmetric information without
signal extraction for economies displaying expansionary depreciations (￿ > 0)
or strongly contractionary depreciations (￿ < ￿2￿). Simulations for these two
cases are presented in panels A and B of Figure 3.
I now turn to the comparison between full information and the other type
of informational imperfections, that of asymmetric information without signal
extraction. For the latter case, panel A of Figure 3 (top chart) shows impulse
responses for an economy displaying expansionary depreciations to an adverse
risk premium shock. The main pattern here is that the interest rate rises
and the exchange rate depreciates, qualitatively the same results as obtained
under full information (Figure 1, panel A, top chart).18 The only di⁄erence
with respect to full information outcomes is circumscribed to the reaction of
the interest rate on impact: it does not move under asymmetric information
without signal extraction, while it goes up in the case of full information. The
17One last point concerning the comparison of models for mildly contractionary depre-
ciations refers to the role of non-fundamental behaviour. In this area, there is basically
no di⁄erence between the three di⁄erent approaches studied here. The theoretical analyses
presented above con￿rm the potential relevance of non-fundamental behaviour even after
relaxing the assumption of full information.
18For this same shock, the similarity of results carries over to the case of asymmetric
information with signal extraction (Figure 2, panel A, top chart).
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shock, the results mirror those obtained under full information for the real
exchange rate, which appreciates in response to the emergence of a positive
excess demand for goods. However, the central bank￿ s lack of contemporaneous
information implies that interest rate is left unchanged, as opposed to hiked
under full information. Finally, for both shocks, assuming that ￿ = 0:1 instead
of ￿ = 0:2 has, in the present case, a di⁄erent e⁄ect on results for interest rates
on impact. More concretely, while changing ￿ a⁄ects the intensity with which
the central bank responds to shocks, it has no consequences whatsoever for
interest rates in the initial period, which stay at zero under any of the two
shocks considered. Other than that, reactions of impulse responses in panel A
of Figure 3 to a smaller value of ￿ are broadly similar to those obtained under
full information: a) the exchange rate ￿ uctuates by a wider margin in reaction
to either shock; and b) interest rates are, after the initial period, raised by
less in the face of adverse ￿nancial disturbances and cut by more under real
shocks.
For the case of strongly contractionary depreciations, panel B of Figure 3
presents in its top chart the reaction of interest rates and exchange rates to
a negative ￿nancial disturbance under asymmetric information without sig-
nal extraction. Interest rates (after the initial period) go up and the exchange
rate strengthens in real terms, the same results obtained under full information
(Figure 1, panel B).19 As with panel A of Figure 3 (top chart), the only di⁄er-
ence is circumscribed to the reaction of the interest rate on impact: it is left
unchanged in the case of asymmetric information without signal extraction,
while it rises under full information. The bottom chart in panel A of Figure
3 indicates that, in the face of a net export shock, the results mirror those
obtained under full information for the real exchange rate, which depreciates
in response to the emergence of a positive excess demand for goods. Instead,
19Once more, for this same disturbance, results are equally comparable to those found
under asymmetric information with signal extraction (Figure 2, panel B).
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interest rate does not move, as opposed to being cut in the case of full infor-
mation.
In sum, I ￿nd that full information results do not appear to be robust to
the presence of informational frictions. For economies exhibiting expansion-
ary or strongly contractionary depreciations, such frictions are responsible for
two optimal deviations from full information outcomes: i) under asymmetric
information with signal extraction, the realisation of a relatively less frequent
shock leads the central bank to behave as if a more likely disturbance had
instead taken place; and ii) under asymmetric information without signal ex-
traction, the monetary authorities does not react on impact to shocks hitting
the economy. The latter di⁄erence in results also implies that, for expansionary
depreciations, a lower responsiveness of output to exchange rates, which has
an impact on comovements between interest rates and exchange rates under
full information, instead fails for any shock to a⁄ect interest rates on impact
under asymmetric information without signal extraction. Finally, in the case
of mildly contractionary depreciations, both asymmetric information models
predict a lack of response of the central bank to aggregate demand shocks, as
opposed to an stabilising movement in interest rates under full information.
4 Concluding remarks
The present paper studies the comovements between interest rates and ex-
change rates in small open economies under ￿ exible exchange rates, comparing
situations where information is full with two alternative models of imperfect
information. The latter distinction has not been made in the previous related
literature, despite the obvious real-life feature of economic decisions that they
are taken under a less-than-perfect understanding of the current state of af-
fairs. In undertaking this study, I also analyse both economies for which
depreciations are expansionary and contractionary. The latter is an attempt
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monly found in emerging economies.
The results of this paper allow us to identify the following three impor-
tant di⁄erences between full and imperfect information. The ￿rst two of these
di⁄erences are speci￿c to each of the two asymmetric information models stud-
ied here (that is, either with or without signal extraction), while the third is
common to both such models. First, in the case of asymmetric information
with signal extraction the policymaker￿ s assessment of the latest exchange rate
data based on past statistical comovements will determine by how much the
results deviate from those obtained under full information. In the baseline
scenarios for cases of expansionary or strongly contractionary depreciations, I
obtain qualitatively the same results for a risk premium disturbance, but very
di⁄erent ones for net export shock. For the latter type of disturbance, when
the informational friction in question is present the central bank will still be
led to think that the shock is more likely to be a risk premium shock. As a
result, under expansionary (strongly contractionary) depreciations the interest
rate will be lowered (raised) and the exchange rate will weaken (strengthen).
Exactly the opposite patterns hold under full information. As a corollary of
these comparisons, one can conclude that there is a trade-o⁄ involved in how
asymmetric information with signal extraction relates to full information. The
closer results are for one type of shock (under the present parameter values,
the risk premium shock), the sharper the contrast with the other type (in the
current environment, the net export shock). If a ranking of the variability in
the two shocks in question is reversed from baseline, the speci￿c results would
also be swapped, while the trade-o⁄ in the comparability of results across
models would still obtain.
Second, in the case of asymmetric information without signal extraction,
a di⁄erence with respect to full information arises as to how monetary policy
reacts on impact to both shocks. This applies to either a risk premium or a
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strongly contractionary depreciations. While the interest rate is left unchanged
under asymmetric information without signal extraction, it moves under full
information - the concrete direction depending on which shock happens to
occur. The ￿xity of interest rates on impact under the informational friction
in question simply re￿ ects the assumption that the central bank does not have
access to relevant contemporaneous data. At the time of monetary policy
decisions, this data is not even available to other agents, from whose actions
the authorities could indirectly deduce some of the real-time data properties.
Finally, for both types of shocks, assuming a smaller responsiveness of output
to exchange rates in the present case implies a di⁄erent outcome in terms of
how interest rates react on impact. More concretely, changing that parameter
has no consequences whatsoever for interest rates on impact under asymmetric
information without signal extraction, which stay at zero under any of the
two shocks considered. This compares with an active initial monetary policy
response - one that does depend on which shock occurs - under full information.
Third, for economies showing mildly contractionary depreciations the re-
sponses to net export shocks are di⁄erent for the entire path of exchange
rates and interest rates when we compare the cases of asymmetric informa-
tion (both with and without signal extraction) with that of full information.
This di⁄erence is easy to grasp. Under either imperfect information model,
the nominal exchange rate is backward looking, and given that the central
bank is initially unresponsive, the ￿rst-period behaviour of the real exchange
rate depends on whether the shock has an impact on the price level. This
implies that a favourable net export shock leads to a real exchange rate ap-
preciation on impact, while the interest rate stays at its baseline level. This is
not true under full information, in which case the real exchange rate - which
is directly observed by the authorities - is initially unresponsive. The mon-
etary authorities react to the shock, which is expansionary and in￿ ationary,
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net export disturbance is also found to di⁄er between the full and imperfect
information models. Under full information, both the interest rate and the
real exchange rate fall below baseline before eventually going back to steady
state. Instead, asymmetric information models predict that the interest rate
will be higher and the real exchange rate will remain stronger before starting
their convergent paths to long run levels.
One last point worth mentioning refers to whether non-fundamental dy-
namics play a di⁄erent role depending on the type of informational assump-
tions used. My conclusion is that there is basically no di⁄erence between the
three di⁄erent approaches studied here. The theoretical analyses presented
above con￿rm the potential relevance of non-fundamental behaviour under
mildly contractionary depreciations, even after relaxing the assumption of full
information. While in my study sunspots are neglected for simplicity, future
work would bene￿t from an assessment as to whether non-fundamental dy-
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δ > 0
                 B) Case 
δ = -1.5
                 C) Case 
δ = -0.1
Figure. 1. Full information case: Impulse responses of interest rate and real exchange rate
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δ > 0
                 B) Case 
δ = -1.5
                 C) Case 
δ = -0.1
Figure. 2. Asymmetric information with signal extraction: Impulse responses of interest rate and real exchange rate
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δ > 0
                 B) Case 
δ = -1.5
                 C) Case 
δ = -0.1
Figure. 3. Asymmetric information without signal extraction: Impulse responses of interest rate and real exchange rate
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